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COMEON LAW PLEAS AND SUBSEQUENT PLEADINGS IN
WEST VIRGINIA
LEo CARLUN
Some time ago the writer published an article1 dealing with
the common law declaration in West Virginia, the general pur-
pose of which was to collect and analyze the local statutes modi-
fying or dispensing with common law requirements and to de-
termine what further might be done by way of statutory reform.
It is now proposed to deal with some of the features of common
law pleas and the subsequent pleadings somewhat in the same man-
ner and with the same general purpose in view. Necessarily, an
attempt can be made to deal only with selected details of the
subject. The pleadings discussed will be considered in chronologi-
cal order.
It will be observed that the defendant, in assuming his initial
pleading task, is confronted with a more complicated problem
than that assumed by the plaintiff in framing his declaration.
Not only must he determine the content and form of the allega-
tions and formal parts of his plea, once the appropriate method
of defense is selected, but he must first of all select and adapt
his method of defense with reference to what the plaintiff has al-
ready alleged. More specifically, he must decide whether he is
going to traverse, confess and avoid, or plead by way of estoppel;
or, since he is no longer confined to a single defense,' whether he
will do more than one of these things all at the same time. This
discussion will deal first with the form and contents of the plea,
leaving what is believed to be the more complicated problem, se-
lection of the proper method of defense, for subsequent attention.
If the defendant decides to traverse, his task under the local
law is very simple; in fact, so simple that it would seem that
nothing could be done to make it easier. The common or specific
traverse and the special traverse, which contributed so many in-
tricacies and technicalities to the era of special pleading, although
not abolished by statute, are obsolete in this state.' If the de-
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1 The Common Law Declaration in West Virginia (1928) 35 W. VA. L.
QuAn. 1.2W. VA. REv. CoDE (1931) e. 56, art. 4, § 39.
"'The common traverse denies the allegation of the declaration in tho
language of the allegation traversed, and it is said that not many instances
of it occur in pleas. At present it is rarely encountered in pleading, and
when it is, it is treated as the general issue. The special traverse, or traverse
1
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fendant desires to traverse the allegations in the declaration, he
now does so collectively by a general traverse, more commonly
known as the general issue, and there should be no difficulty in
pleading the general issue, whatever the manner in which it is
pleaded. Although it may be pleaded as a formal written plea, if
the defendant so elects, nevertheless, if so pleaded, owing to the
uniformity of its language for all cases coming within a given
form of action and the availability of unvarying precedents, there
is little excuse for getting it wrong. However, there is no necessity
for taking whatever risk there may be in resorting to a formal
plea. It is not necessary to plead it formally at all. The measure
of its traversing function, although logically indefinite, is yet so
well established by precedent that it may be taken as traversing
symbolically, rather than through the express purport of its
language, and hence may be pleaded by name only, the defendant
thus at the same time dispensing with both form and allegations.
The defendant is concerned with the allegation of facts only
when he undertakes to plead a special, or affirmative, plea, which
may be by way of confession and avoidance or by way of estoppel.
And, since it is only when he undertakes to plead specially that he
is under any necessity of resorting to a formal plea, it is here that
he is particularly concerned with the form of the plea and the con-
tent of its allegations. An examination of the local law will indi-
cate that the defendant is hampered very little with the require-
ments of form, if he should desire to abandon the formal habili-
ments still clinging to the precedents.
The parts of a plea have been enumerated by Professor Minor'
as follows: (1) the title of the court and the rules; (2) the names
of the parties in the margin; (3) the commencement, including
especially the defense; (4) the actionem non, in pleas by way of
confession and avoidance; (5) the body or substance of the plea;
and (6) the conclusion, embracing (a) the tender of issue, or the
verification, and (b) the prayer of judgment when there is a veri-
fication.
It has been decided in a recent case that it is unnecessary to
entitle the declaration as of the court in which it is filed. If
with an absque hoc, or formal traverse, or simple traverse has fallen into
'innocuous desuetude,' is rarely used, is seldom if ever of any value, and is
of interest from an historical rather than a practical standpoint." BURKS'
PLEADING AND PREcTiCE (1913) 328-9.
But see W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) e. 56, art. 4, § 43, regulating its use and,
therefore, implying its possibility as a pleading.
'4 MxNOR, INSTTES (1878) 635, 640.
Fleming v. Hartrick, 100 W. Va. 714, 131 S. E. 558 (1926).
2
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such is true as to the declaration, a fortioHi the same would be true
as to pleas; and of course there would be still less necessity for
entitling a plea as of the rules at which it is filed.0
The names of the parties in the margin "do not strictly con-
stitute a part of the plea,' and hence might be omitted, but never-
theless serve a useful purpose. Such a designation of the parties
serves to identify compendiously the action in which the plea is
filed and, by reference, will supply a description of the parties
for the commencement of the plea.
At the common law, the commencement of the plea was clut-
tered with various formalities, some of them extremely technical
in their application.8 All of these are dispensed with by a local
statute.
"No formal defense shall be required in a plea. It may
commence as follows: 'The defendant says that.' I"
The actionem non,1' at the common law proper only in pleas
in bar by way of confession and avoidance, is no longer necessary'
under the local law.
"In a plea, replication or subsequent pleading, intended
to be pleaded in bar or in maintenance of the action, it shall
not be necessary to use any allegation of 'actionem non' or
'precludi non', or to the like effect, or any prayer of judg-
ment. '
At the common law, all the general issues except nul tiel
record' and the common, or specific, traverses conclude to the
0 4 MINOR, INSTTUTES (1878) 568.
Tid. 635.
8 1d. 635-7.
9 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 40.
101Ought not to have or maintain his aforesaid action against him."
1 Professor Minor assumes that, if the plea is intended as a defense to
only part of the cause of action, the statute does not dispense with the
actio'em ion. 4 Minor, Institutes (1878) 637-9. This assumption is based
on the supposition that the local statute is intended to operate with the same
effect as the Hilary Term Rules read, "intended to be pleaded in bar of the
whole action generally." 1 CHITTY, PLEADINGS (16th Am. ed. 1879) 752.
Our statute leaves out the words, "whole action generally". Even if this
construction of the local statute is correct, there would seem to be no necessity
for the formal acttonem Aon. Its only purpose in the case of a partial de-
fense would be to indicate that the plea went only to a part of the cause of
action. This fact the pleader would hardly omit, otherwise his plea would
be demurrable as too large; but there is no reason why he should be com-
pelled to resort to the formal actionem non for such a purpose.
22 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 41.
18 "The plea of nul tiel record does not conclude to the country, because the
matter is to be determined by the court by inspection of the record." Wil-
bur v. Abbott, 59 N. H. 132, SUNDERLAND, CASES ON COMMON LAW PLEADING
579 (1879).
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country.!' The special traverse, because it contains new matter in
the inducement, and all special pleas alleging new matter conclude
with a verification.' As already stated, the special traverse is
obsolete under our practice, but we nevertheless have a statute
copied from the English Hilary Term Rules which provides that
it, like other traverses, shall conclude to the country'
These formal conclusions are merely devices which serve to
identify pleas as traverses or as special pleas introducing new
matter, as the case may be. If the plea concludes to the country,
this is an indication that it is a traverse and tenders an issue for
jury trial; and if it concludes with a verification, the indication
is that it is a special plea introducing new matter which calls for
further pleading before an issue may be tendered. Since the
nature of the plea must first be determined in order to select the
proper conclusion, it would seem that adding the conclusion is a
mere formality and that its omission should not constitute a sub-
stantial defect. Such is the view of Mr. Chitty.
"Since the statute (of Anne), a wrong or defective con-
clusion, either to the country or with a verification, &c. can
only be objected to by special demurrer."' 7
In the absence of any specific statutory provision, it would
seem that the local statute," descendant of the statute of Anne,
dispensing generally with the necessity for formal allegations in
pleadings, would dispense with a conclusion either to the country
or with a verification. Nevertheless, we have a statute which,
while it prohibits a demurrer to a pleading because it lacks a
verification, still excuses the opposite party from replying to the
pleading until a verification is added." It would seem that the
statute might wholly dispense with a conclusion either to the
country or with a verification without causing any confusion.'
""And of this he puts himself upon the country."
1"And this he is ready to verify."
18 X. 3, mpra.
17 1 CHiTY, PLrEADn Gs (16th Am. ed. 1879) 585.
'W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 37.MdIbZ.
See 4 Mmorp, INSTrUTES (1878) 620, critieising the statute. "We have
thus the singular anomaly of the legislature itself propounding a demurrer
without the agency of the party, in several instances of the most immaterial
formality, whilst in all other cases the courts are denied the means of com-
pelling pleaders to employ the accustomed forms of allegation, notwithstanding
serious difficulties and inconveniences will arise from their habitual non-
observance." See Merchants' and Mechanics' Bank of Wheeling v. Evans
and Dorsey, 9 W. Va. 373 (1876), seemingly holding that pleas may properly
be rejected because they lack a conclusion to the country. It is submitted that
such a view is technical and should not be followed at the present day.
4
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As to the final conclusion, the prayer of judgment, it will be
noted that the statute above quoted" dispenses with such a con-
clusion in a plea "in bar or in maintenance of the action."' How-
ever, the express language of the statute indicates that it does not
apply to pleas in abatement, and the local pleader must still have
recourse to the precedents for forms of the various prayers of
judgment appropriate to the different classes of pleas in abate-
ment."
The body or substance of the plea, of course, will contain all
the allegations of facts constituting the defense. As to the form
and substance of these allegations, it may be said briefly that the
statutes dispensing with profert," allegation of time' or place,'
except when material, fictions for the purpose of making the
venue of the facts correspond with the venue of the action,' and
dispensing generally with formal requirements,' all of which are
discussed in the article dealing with the declaration," are equally
applicable to pleas in bar. To these may be added the statute
which dispenses with the necessity for a protestation in any
pleading.'
The collective result of these statutes would seem to be that
the facts of the defense in a plea in bar may be alleged in any
language, rhetorical form or sequence which will make the facts
intelligible, without any restrictions as to form, and that the
pleader could not demand any more liberality in this respect. In
fact, as a mere matter -of literary construction, it would seem that
the pleader would find it inconvenient to dispense with many
of the features of form which the statutes would permit him to
ignore.
It should be remembered, however, that the statute dispensing
generally with formal requirements" does not apply to pleas in
'W. V .REV. CoDE (1931), c. 56, art. 4, § 41.
"1To the effect that a prayer of judgmenty for the reasons explained in
n. 11, supra, would still be necessary in a plea asserting a partial defense,
see 4 MNon, IwsTrrus (1878) 639. But why, if the body of the plea In-
dicates that it is asserted only to a specific part of the cause of action, should
a prayer of judgment be any more essential in such a plea than in a plea
to the whole action?
3 The actionem non, of course, is improper in pleas in abatement. Pleas
in abatement ordinarily have no formal commencement.
"W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 15.
2Id., c. 56, art. 4, § 16.
6Id., c. 56, art. 4, §§ 14, 16.
"Id., c. 56, art. 4, § 14.
2Id., c. 56, art. 4, § 37.
"O Op. cit. supra n. 1.
"W. V A. REV. CODE (1931) C. 56, art. 4, § 42.
" Spra n. 28.
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abatement and that such pleas are still left open to demurrer for
formal defects, a statutory policy which reflects the often re-
peated enmity of the courts toward dilatory pleas.O
The real problem which confronts the pleader under the local
practice is not concerned with the form or substance of any given
plea, but rather with the selection of the proper mode or modes of
defense. Before the pleader can make a start in solving this prob-
lem, it is necessary for him to determine the various functions of
the different modes of defense and the operative effect of the
different classes of pleas by which the different modes of defense
may be asserted. The trouble lies principally with the general
issues.
After the declaration has been filed in a common law action,
it is familiar law that the pleading process must be carried for-
ward until an issue results from something affirmed on one side
and denied on the other. This is a fundamental particularly em-
phasized (although in the later days of general pleading by no
means always practically observed) in the common law system;
but it would not seem to be the peculiar fruit of any technical
tendency that may be ascribed to that system. It is a require-
ment which, in some form and to some extent, cannot be dis-
pensed with in any system of pleading without abandoning one
of the practical objects of pleading. It is the accomplishment of
this result-the production of some sort of an issue, however gen-
eral in its scope-which is supposed to deliver the judicial method
of defining and settling controversies from the chaos so generally
prevalent in lay disputation. The only difference of opinion
should be as to the methods by which this object is to be attained
and how far we may go in the way of seeking precision in the re-
sults without over refining the process.
The common law formula for carrying on the pleading pro-
cess is to the effect that, after the declaration has been filed, each
party in turn, unless he demurs, must plead, either (1) by way
of traverse or (2) by way of confession and avoidance,' until an
issue has been reached by something affirmed on one side and de-
2 If such a policy is proper, of course the present state of the statutory
law is in accord with it. But it has always seemed to the writer inconsistent
for the law to tell a party that he has a clear right (to use dilatory pleas)
and then proceed to place formal obstacles in the way of asserting that right.
If such requirements merely operated to qualify the right and to reduce it
to equitable proportions, very well and good; but to admit the unqualified
right and then place artificial obstacles in the way of it is an entirely dif-
ferent thing.
OThis is the way the formula is usually stated. Strictly, a third alterna-
tive, "by way of estoppel", should be added.
6
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nied on the other. Hence the first task with which the pleader
is confronted is to determine which one of these alternatives is
appropriate for the particular defense which he proposes to urge.
In more concrete language, since in this state the common, or
specific, traverse and the special traverse are obsolete for purposes
of controverting the allegations in the declaration, the problem for
the defendant to solve is whether he will plead the general issue
or a special plea; or, since he now may plead more than one plea,
whether he will plead both the general issue and a special plea or
pleas, the general issue ordinarily being pleaded as a matter of
course.
Common law pleading reached the pinnacle of its develop-
ment in the form of a technical and subtle art, preeminently as a
system of special pleading. Not only were the common, or specific,
traverse and the special traverse preferred to the general issue,
but the proper functions of the general issue were usurped even by
special pleas, through employment of the fictional device of giv-
ing express color in pleas alleging facts constituting mere argu.
mentative denials. The later ascendency of the general traverses
may be taken in a large measure as the manifestation of a desire
to escape from the fictions, subtleties and technicalities incidental
to the use of specific denials.
It will be noted that the original tendency of the general
issues-those in the older forms of action, and presumably the
earlier general issues in assumpsit and case-was mainly to serve
as substitutes for specific denials. In other words, their general
tendency was to put in issue only such matters in the declaration
as might have been put in issue by the use of a common, or specific,
traverse or a special traverse. For instance, the plea of not guilty
in trespass, one of the older forms of action, puts in issue the
act of trespass and the property right, either of which might have
been put in issue by a specific traverse. If all the general issues
had been confined to this simple and logical function as substitutes
for specific denials, it would seem that there should not have been
much confusion as to the scope of the general issues or as to when
it would be permissible and necessary to resort to a special, or
affirmative, plea. A defendant was permitted to traverse
specifically only the material allegations of the declaration, and
such was the maximum measure of denial of what may be taken
as the model general issue, not guilty in trespass. Since the bur-
den is generally upon the plaintiff to prove all the material allega-
tions of his declaration, another way of stating the scope of this
7
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general issue is that it puts in issue every allegation of the declara-
tion which the plaintiff would be compelled to prove to make a
prima facie case." But, unfortunately for the logic of pleading,
the development of the geueral traverses did not stop -with this
definite and logical delimitation which would have permitted the
formulation of a single, general and standard rule for the purpose
of defining the scope of all the general issues.
The general issues in case and assumpsit, although not the
only culprits, ordinarily are the principal targets for criticism.
This is perhaps true not so much because of the breadth of their
transgressions (yet there are none broader), as because of the fact
that their functions belie their names and contradict the express
purport of their language. Not only do they put in issue the
material allegations of the declaration, but, in addition thereto,
include most affirmative defenses which in other forms of action
must be pleaded specially. That this constitutes an illogical ex-
pansion of the scope of these general issues is indicated by the
fact that it can be explained only on historical grounds, and that
legal historians are not even in accord as to the historical facts.
The different views are thus set forth by Professor Minor:
"The declaration in the action of trespass on the case in
assumpsit, states that the defendant, upon a certain considera-
tion therein set forth, made a certain promise to the plaintiff,
(St. P1. 40; Id. (Tyler's Ed.) 72.) The general issue of non-
assumpsit avers that defendant 'did not undertake or promise
in manner and form,' &c. This, according to its terms, puts in
issue merely the fact of the defendant's having made a promise
such as is alleged. A much wider effect, however, in practice
belongs to this plea, for which two reasons have been assigned.
The first, suggested by Mr. Stephen, is that it is owing to the
fact that the action of assumpsit is not unfrequently founded
upon an implied promise, as well as upon an express one; and
that the extension of the issue of non assumpsit was at first
applied only in those cases where the promise was implied from
circumstances, it being deemed not unreasonable that under
a plea denying the promise, any circumstance should be
provable which tended to repel the implication. And the
doctrine having been once established in respect to implied
assumpsit, it was, by a fallacious analogy, ultimately extended
to such also as are express. The other reason has all the
authority to be derived from the name of Lord Mansfield;
but savoring as it does of his loose equity views of legal doc-
trines and processes, is not much regarded at present. It is
Fuller v. Rounceville, 29 N. H. 554, SuNDE i, CASES ON COmmoN LAw
PLEADING, 563 (1854).
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that the action of assumpsit (as well as other actions on the
case), is founded on the mere justice and conscience of the
plaintiff's ease, and is in the nature of a bill in equity, and in
effect is so; and, therefore, a release, payment, accord and
satisfaction, or in short, whatever in equity and conscience
will preclude the plaintiff from recovering, may properly be
given in evidence under a plea which denies the existence of
the demand. (St. P1. 162 n (20); Id. (Tyler's Ed.) 1734;
Bird v. Randall, 3 Burr. 1653; 1 Chit. P1. 527.) "
"The declaration in trespass on the case in general sets
forth specifically the subject of complaint; and this general
issue of not guilty in terms is a mere traverse of the facts
alleged in the declaration, and therefore on principle should be
applied only where the defense rests on such denial. But
here a relaxation has taken place similar to that which pre-
vails in trespass on the case in assumpsit; for under the plea
in question, not only is a defendant permitted to contest the
declaration, but with certain exceptions, (e. g. the statute of
limitations, the truth in an action of libel, &c.,) to prove any
matter of defense which tends to show that the plaintiff has
no right of action, though the matter be in confession and
avoidance, as e. g. a release given, or satisfaction made. This
relaxation of the just principles of pleading seems to have no
other excuse but that of a forced analogy to the similar
practice in trespass on the case in assumpsit. (St. Pl. 162, n
(20) ; Id. (Tyler's Ed.) 178-9.) '
This illogical, even if expedient, expansion of the two general
issues mentioned is objectionable for more than one reason. While
they, like other general issues, with at least one anomalous ex-
ception,' perform the legitimate function of putting in issue the
material allegations of the declaration, they do not stop there.
They permit other defenses to be asserted at the trial which have
never been put in issue in any proper sense at all. It is
ordinarily said that they put in issue certain enumerated affirm-
ative defenses, such as infancy, accord and satisfaction, etc., but
in fact they do nothing of the sort. They merely warn the plain-
tiff that the defendant may elect at the trial to rely upon num-
erous affirmative defenses the facts of which have never been put
in issue by any pleading, because nothing has even been affirmed,
much less denied, in the pleadings with reference to such facts.
Hence, as to such defenses, they give no notice to the plaintiff of
the nature or extent of the evidence which he must prepare to
combat, nor do they furnish any guide for the introduction of
104 MINoR, INsTiTuTEs (1878) 644-5.
wId. 646.
7 Falsity (or truth) of the words in an action for libel or slander.
9
Carlin: Common Law Pleas and Subsequent Pleadings in West Virginia
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1931
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
proof by either party. Such issues as are produced are developed
and finally emerge from the proof process.' The great breadth
of these general issues, however, would seem to minimize any risk
that the defendant might take in relying on too broad a content,
since one can easily retain in memory the few exceptional defenses
which cannot be asserted under them. Yet upon his memory the
pleader must rely, and not upon any logical rule, for the purpose
of determining what he must plead specially.
Confusion in another respect, although perhaps not very ex-
cusable, may arise for those who do not thoroughly comprehend
the anomalous situation. A defendant is not compelled to assert
any defense involving new matter under these broad general is-
sues. He merely has the option to do so. If he so elects, he has
the right to plead any new matter in a special plea, in spite of the
fact that he has already pleaded the general issue and might as-
sert the defense under the latter plea." He has this right because
such a special plea truly confesses and avoids the declaration. But
the fact that such use may be made, and frequently is made, of a
special plea, may give rise to the unwarranted impression that the
special plea is a necessity under such circumstances, rather than
a privilege."0 And this confusion may be augmented by the fact
that defenses involving new matter must be pleaded specially in
other forms of action.'
As already suggested, the general issues in case and assumpsit
are not the only ones which usurp the legitimate functions of
special pleas. Nil debet, in an action of debt on a simple contract,
is said to be equally as broad as non assumpsit," and there are few
13"Nor was it difficult to make a plausible case against the extended
scope which had been given to the general issue, for, though it was by far
the most efficacious remedy for the evils of the system of special pleading,
it had its defects. The issue was not clearly defined. Issues of fact were
not distinguished from issues of law, and the parties did not know exactly
what were the issues of fact upon which the case really turned, It followed
from this that the parties incurred expense by reason of the 'unnecessary
accumulation of proof,' often of facts which turned out at the trial to be
undisputed." W. S. Holdsworth, The New Bules of Pleading of the Hilary
Term, 1834, 1 CAMBRMGE L. J. 261 (1923), quoted in CLARK, CASES ON
PLEADING AND PROCEDURE (1930) 154.
"'First National Bank of West Union v. Freeman, 83 W. Va. 477, 98 S.
E. 558 (1919); State v. Turner, 84 W. Va. 485, 100 S. E. 294 (1919).
"0For instance, the writer some years ago heard a practitioner of consider-
able experience insist that infancy must be asserted by a special plea in
assumpsit.
"For example, infancy, which may come in under the general issue in
assumpsit, must be pleaded specially in covenant.
"Virginia Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Buck, 88 Va. 517, 13 S. E.
973 (1891). See 4 MINOR, INsTiTuTEs (1878), 641-2, criticising this general
issue as too broad.
10
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defenses which cannot be asserted under non detinet in detinue and
"not guilty" in trover. N4l debet and non detinet are naturally
broad in their terms, operating, as they do, under the present tense.0
Furthermore, they operate upon very general allegations in the
declaration, as does "not guilty" in trover. In fact, "not guilty"
in trover traverses a broad legal conclusion alleged in the declara-
tion. But the fact remains that these traverses permit many de-
fenses which have nothing to do with a denial of allegations which
the plaintiff must prove in order to establish a prima facie case
and give as little notice to the plaintiff of the nature of the de-
fense as do the general issues in case and assumpsit. Such being
so, the practical situation will receive little aid from the mere
logic of language.
A reaction developed against the general issues. No doubt
a large measure of this reaction resulted from a realization of the
obvious evils of a system of pleading that had become too general;
but the reaction was at least stimulated and partly guided by the
influence of lawyers, such as Stephen," who had not forgotten the
splendors of the golden age of pleading-the subtleties and artistry
of special pleading, which offered the legal knight errant such a
worthy opportunity to test his mettle.
This reaction culminated in the adoption in England, in 1834,
of the famous Hilary Term Rules; and in America, in the enact-
ment in New York, in 1848, of the Field Code, the latter being
the progenitor of the various practice codes which were afterward
adopted in a majority of the states. The general tendency of these
rules and codes is toward a system of special pleading, but the
Hilary Term Rules, more particularly than the codes, exemplify
this tendency by way of specific attack upon the general issues.
The results obtained from the Hilary Term Rules were far
from satisfactory. Professor Holdsworth refers to them as a
"disastrous mistake."" Yet it has always seemed to the writer
that the general object of these rules was both logical and ex-
pedient, if the reaction away from general pleading had not been
carried too far in the opposite direction.
The general effect of the Hilary Term Rules was to narrow
the scope of the general issues by way of requiring specific
traverses or special pleas in numerous instances where the general
"The Hilary Term Rules substituted "numquam indebitatus" for %it
debet.
"Stephen was one of the commissioners who framed the Hilary Term
Rules.
I See CLARx, CAss ON PLEADiNG Ax Pscmuan (1930), 155.
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issue had before been sufficient. Not only did they divorce the
abnormally broad general issues from their illogical content, but
they further narrowed the traversing effect of all the general is-
sues until they amounted to nothing more than single specific
traverses. For example, under the common law, "not guilty" in
trespass denies both the plaintiff's property right and the act of
trespass, because without these two things the plaintiff does not
have a prima facie case. But under the Hilary Term Rules, only
the act of trespass was put in issue, and, in the absence of a
specific traverse of the property right, it was confessed, in spite
of the fact that it is one of the indispensable original elements of
the plaintiff's cause of action. As a result, many of the original
evils of special pleading were revived. But the mischief did not
stop there. An entirely new field of uncertainty was opened up,
producing a multitude of cases in which the courts were called
upon to construe the rules and decide the propriety of their ap-
plication.
The object of the practice codes is not, like the Hilary Term
Rules, to amend the common law situation, but rather to substi-
tute a new system for the common law system. They differ some-
what in the different states, but, as compared with the common
law system in its present state, their general tendency is in the
direction of special pleading. Already enough evils have arisen
from this tendency to cause dissatisfaction. They are not subject
to all the technicalities of common law special pleading, but still
their tendency is to over refine and over regulate the processes
of pleading. There is a growing suspicion that, although the
practice codes may be better than the common law system, still
we have not yet succeeded in discovering the ideal system, even
relatively. It is believed that there is at least the beginning of a
present reaction back again in the direction of general pleading,
without any very definite goal toward which it is directed.'
Should we make a change in the local practice? If so, what
should we do? As long as we retain the common law forms of
action and the common law declaration, perhaps we should not
seriously consider doing anything other than to alter the common
law system with reference to pleas and the subsequent pleadings.
A study of the reactions enumerated above, which are almost,
if not quite, "equal and opposite in direction," would seem to
justify one generalization, if no other: that all systems of plead-
"a This tendency may be noted in the implications arising from such terms
as "notice pleading", a generalization frequently heard in recent days.
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ing, without exception, are machinations of the devil, and as such
are to be endured, if at all, like sin, as a necessary evil. To this
sentiment the writer is willing to subscribe. Yet it is believed
that lawyers should not have as much difficulty in demonstrating
the necessity for their evil as theologians have encountered in
justifying sin. It is believed that it is a virtue in pleading to
dispense with pleading as far as practicable. But some pleading,
in some form at some stage of the procedure, we must tolerate.
If a disclosure of all defenses, like the affirmative defenses now
comprehended within the scope of the general issue, were trans-
ferred from the pleadings to the trial process, one or the other of
two possible consequences would follow: (1) The trial might pro-
ceed without any of the issues being defined in advance of the
introduction of evidence. Such a situation would not be any worse
than part of the situation which now exists. (2) The parties at
the trial, preliminary to the introduction of proof, might give
way to a spontaneous and inevitable urge to define some sort of
an issue and resort to oral altercation, either before the court or
before the jury by way of opening statement. This would be a
mere reversion to the days of oral pleading.
There is something to be said in favor of transferring as
much of the burden as practicable from the pleadings to the trial
process, as a means of escaping technicality. There seems to be
an inevitable tendency in any system of pleading, designed to
operate and be controlled through its own mechanism, to resort to
and develop technicalities. This seems to be inherent in the nature
of the process. The less formal and more spontaneous methods of
the trial process would tend to obliterate matters which call for
technical decision in the pleading process. Yet it is believed that
this consideration would justify neither of the alternatives men-
tioned above. The conclusion is that there must be a compromise,
and the problem is where to draw the line.
Perhaps some who have not taken the trouble to analyze the
situation may be startled by the statement that in most of the
forms of action virtually all pleading may be dispensed with ex-
cept the allegations in the declaration. Enough has already been
said to indicate the purport of this statement. Practically all de-
fenses come in under the general issues. It must be pleaded, of
course, in the absence of a special plea, to make up an issue. But
the plaintiff always expects it and comes prepared to meet it.
So far as it casts the burden of proof upon him, he looks to his
declaration and not to the plea to determine the nature of that
burden. To this extent and for this purpose, the plea is a mere
13
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formality, and for that reason may be pleaded generally and in-
formally. But to the extent that it permits all the various de-
fenses involving new matter, it is really no plea at all. The plain-
tiff would be just as well off if a statute provided that the de-
fendant might assert such defenses in the absence of any plea.
It would be no radical departure from the present state of the
law if a statute should be enacted providing that the general
issues in most of the forms of action should be abolished; that all
the material allegations of the declaration should be in issue with-
out a plea; that all other defenses, except a few specifically enum-
erated, might be asserted without a plea; and that the defenses so
enumerated should be asserted by special pleas. In fact, it may be
seriously considered whether such a statute would not tend to
simplify the situation. This is a matter for consideration by those
who are satisfied with the present scope of the general issues.
It is assumed, however, that the majority of objectors to the
present situation disapprove of the scope of the general issues in
most of the forms of action and are interested only in seeking some
practical method by which the scope may be narrowed. In se-
lecting the method, it will likely be agreed that, other things being
equal, it would be desirable to devise and adopt some logical and
uniform rule, for the purpose of defining the scope, that may in-
telligently be applied in all the forms of action. Four possible
alternatives are suggested. (1) Each general issue may be narrow-
ed to the scope of a specific traverse denying what is supposed to
be the principal allegation of the declaration, leaving all other
allegations to be denied by specific traverses and all defenses in-
volving new matter to be asserted by special pleas. Such was the
practical effect of the Hilary Term Rules. (2) The scope of each
general issue may be made to depend upon the literal language of
its formal allegations, its traversing breadth being determined by
the purport of its language as operating upon the allegations of the
declaration. (3) It may be provided that the general issue in each
form of action shall put in issue only such allegations of the
declaration as, if specifically traversed, the plaintiff would be com-
pelled to prove to make a prima facie case. (4) It may be pro-
vided that the general issue in each form of action shall put in
issue all the material allegations of the declaration. '
The first alternative would bring back the evils of special
pleading, and, therefore, would be subject to all the criticism
'?Something in the nature of the third or the fourth alternative is now
common in the code states.
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which has been incurred by the Hilary Term Rules." Such a solu-
tion, in fact, would involve, not reformation, but abolishment, of
the general issues, and a mere transfer of their names to certain
selected specific traverses.
The second alternative would be undesirable for more than
one reason, assuming (as is assumed) that the language of the
general issues is not to be changed, but that they are to be accepted
in their present and long established general form. A serious
objection is that the language is so general in its purport, having
final significance only by way of reference to and operation upon
the allegations of the declaration, that it would furnish an in-
definite guide as to the traversing effect. It was probably this
consideration which caused the commissioners who framed the
Hilary Term Rules specifically and literally to define the content
of the various so called general issues which they established.
Moreover, such a solution would leave some of the general issues
still too .broad through operation of the express terms of their
language. Such would be true, for reasons already noted, in the
actions of debt on a simple contract, detinue and trover. And it
would seem that nothing definite could be done by way of a change
The following satiric dialogue, quoted in CLAnK, CASES ON PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE (1930) 155-6, is supposed to have taken place between the shades
of Mr. Crogate, of the celebrated Crogate's Case, fountain source of theprinciples governing the replication do injuria, and Baron Surrebuttor, alias
Baron Parke, concerning the Hilary Term Rules.
"Crogate. Oh! you've been making new rules about pleading, have you?
then I suppose, as a matter of course, that you've pretty nearly done away
with the whole thing. Surrebutter B. Done away with special pleading?
Heaven forbid! On the contrary, we adopted it (subject to the relaxation
introduced by the Statute of Anne) in even more than its original integrity;
for we have enforced the necessity of special pleas in many actions in which
the whole ease was previously left at large, on the merits under the generalissue. And we framed a series of rules on the subject, which have given a
truly magnificent development to this admirable system; so much so, indeed,
that nearly half the cases coming recently before the Court, have been de-
cided upon points of pleading. Crogate. You astonish me. But pray, howdo the suitors like this sort of justice? Surrebutter B. Mr. Crogate, that
consideration has never occurred to me, nor do I conceive that laws ought
to be adapted to suit the tastes and capacities of the ignorant. At first,
to be sure, we found that in consequence of our having restored the ancient
strictness of pleading, when it had been relaxed, and applied it to several
of the most common forms of action to which it had never previously been
applied, plaintiffs were put into considerable perplexity by special pleas.
If they denied too much a demurrer for duplicity followed; and if they onlydenied one point, and consequently admitted the rest, they sometimes traversed
the only allegation which could be proved, or, to use your language, they
took the wrong sow by the ear. In this state of things, though justice wasby no means uniformly defeated, yet this result took place more frequently
than was convenient, and some obloquy was beginning to attach to the new
rules. In this emergency, Mr. Crogate, we fell back on the replication do
injuria with the happiest success. * * * And thus we were enabled to bring
the system of pleading as near to perfection as I believe to be possible."
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in the language that would not result in a mere collection of
specific traverses, unless general language should be adopted for
the purpose of resorting to the third or the fourth alternative.
The third alternative would seem to be more in accord than
any other solution with the true and logical function of a gen-
eral traverse, if we are to have such a traverse at all. In fact,
we already have a precedent for it at the common law in a gen-
eral issue which had become fixed in its content before the pro-
cess of inflation began to operate upon the later general issues.
In the action of trespass, the oldest tort action, the plea of "not
guilty" puts in issue such allegations, and only such allegations,
as the plaintiff is compelled to prove to make a prima facie case.'9
Such a limitation would eliminate defenses involving new matter
from the scope of the general issues in all the forms of action, but
would not compel a resort to specific traverses, as did the Hilary
Term Rules. The effect would be the same as if a separate specific
traverse were pleaded to each material allegation of the declara-
tion which the plaintiff is bound to prove under the present gen-
eral issues, without the risks and complications involved in under-
taking actually to plead such traverses. The general issue, by
force of the statute, would stand as a symbol to this effect, what-
ever the implications that might come from its name or the language
in which it was worded, if indeed it should need to have a name
or to be worded in any language at all other than the mere state-
ment that it is pleaded. Such a solution would seem to be fair to
both the plaintiff and the defendant, and to provide a uniform and
logical rule for the purpose of determining the scope of all the
general issues. On the one hand, the plaintiff must know that
under such a plea he would be compelled to prove all the material
facts alleged in his declaration as to which he had the burden of
proof, and surely he should not object to the task of diagnosing
the nature of the facts which he himself has alleged. And he
would know that he did not have to prepare proof for any other
purpose, unless specifically warned and informed by a special
plea. On the other hand, the situation would be simple for the
defendant. He would know that he was entitled to plead specially,
"0 Fuller v. Rounceville, supra n. 34.
EIt is suggested that the general issue, if it is put in the form of an
allegation at all, either under the third or the fourth alternative, be worded
as follows: " I The defendant traverses generally the plaintiff's declaration; I
or "The defendant traverses generally the first count of the plaintiff's
declaration;" or some equivalent language, leaving it to the statute to define
the breadth of the traverse. Such a form of traverse would be in accord with
the present local practice as to general replications.
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and must plead specially, only such matters as do not operate by
way of denying the material allegations of the declaration as to
which the plaintiff has the burden of proof. There would be no
confusion resulting from the right to elect between the general
issue and a special plea, because there would no longer be any
such right. He would still be under the necessity of distinguish-
ing between facts constituting new matter in confession and avoid-
ance or estoppel and facts the effect of which is merely argumenta-
tively to deny the allegations in the declaration, but this would be
no new burden. He already knows that, under the present prac-
tice, he should not attempt to plead specially any facts the ef-
fect of which is simply to deny an allegation in the declaration,
because, if he does so, his plea is objectionable because it amounts
to the general issue, is an argumentative denial and pleads ev-
idence. But if he made a mistake in this respect, the error would
be one of little consequence."
It may be urged that the general issues, even as narrowed
in their scope by the proposed innovation, would still be im-
practicably broad, because they might compel the plaintiff to
come to the trial prepared to prove allegations in his declaration
which the defendant did not intend to controvert. This objection
is one commonly urged against the present general issues. There
are several counter arguments to this objection.
If the objection be urged in favor of specific traverses, it may
be doubted whether a resort to specific traverses in lieu of a
general traverse would remedy the situation. The defendant is
not, under the statute, confined to a single plea, and the modern
policy of the law is to permit him to assert as many defenses as he
may propose. If he is denied the full logical breadth of the gen-
eral issue as a traverse,\ he will certainly be given the privilege of
pleading a sufficient #umber of specific traverses to cover the
breadth of the general issue. These traverses would presumably
be pleaded with the same facility as the general issue and would
be a means, merely involving more trouble on the part of the de-
fendant, of putting the plaintiff to the same measure of proof to
which he would be subjected by the general issue.
Even under the present law, the plaintiff has a remedy in
s' See BuRKs' PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1913) 330-331. Such pleas havo
been held by the local court properly rejected as amounting to the general
issue. Richards v. Riverside Iron Works, 56 W. V. 510, 49 S. E. 437 (1904) ;
Raleigh County v. Cottle, 79 W. Va. 661, 92 S. E. 110 (1917). But in each
ease observed by the writer, the general issue apparently had already been
pleaded, and the question did not arise as to the effect of the plea standing
alone.
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situations where he conceives that the general issue does not give
him sufficient notice for the purpose of preparing his proof, or
might cause him to come to the trial with a surplus of proof.
"In like manner, if good cause therefor appear, and there
be no unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff in ap-
plying for such order, the court or judge in vacation may
order the defendant to file a more particular statement, in
any respect, of the nature of his defense, or the facts expected
to be proved at the trial, which statement shall be made under
the oath of the defendant, or some other credible person, to
the effect that the affiant believes the same will be supported
by evidence at the trial."'
Under the present scope of the general issues, this statute is
of principal use to the plaintiff as a means of compelling the de-
fendant to disclose his affirmative defenses. Under the proposed
narrower general issues, it would be necessary to assert all such
defenses by special pleas and such pleas, without the aid of any
additional statement, would likely give the plaintiff sufficient
notice. But the statute undoubtedly covers the traversing portion
of the present general issues and would compel statements sup-
plementing them after they had been narrowed as proposed.
Other statutes provide that, in certain specific instances, it
shall not be necessary for the plaintiff to prove certain facts al-
leged in his declaration "unless the pleading which puts the mat-
ter in issue be verified, or there be an affidavit filed therewith
denying" such facts.' If the defendant desires to put such facts
in issue by the general issue, an affidavit denying the specific
facts must accompany the general issue. Otherwise, the facts are
admitted and no proof is necessary.
It may be suggested that these affidavits and sworn state-
ments, to the extent that they deny facts alleged in the declara-
tion, are, after all, merely specific traverses operating under a dis-
guise. Such may be their practical effect upon the issues, but
upon the whole they are desirable substitutes for technical special
pleading, and it is believed that there are other instances not now
covered by the statutes where they should be prescribed." If they
1' W. VA. RLV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 20.
The making, indorsing, assigning or accepting of any writing alleged in
any pleading. W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 46. Entry or
genuineness of a judgment or decree, when recovery thereof is alleged in a
pleading. Idem. The existence of a plaintiff or defendant corporation or
partnership. W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 47.
c4For instance, proof of the ownership or control of property or premises
through which a tort is alleged to have been committed.
Such statutory provisions are justifiable largely upon two assumptions:
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perform the functions of specific traverses, they nevertheless do so
outside of the technical field of pleading, thus performing all the
desirable functions of special pleading and at the same time avoid-
ing the technicalities. They are in effect informal intermediaries
between the pleading process and the proof process, aiding the
latter and avoiding the technicalities of the former.
The fourth alternative mentioned above almost, but not quite,
coincides with the third, and most that has been said with refer-
ence to the third will apply equally to the fourth. The third in-
volves a determination of the burden of proof, while the fourth
does not, simply putting in issue all the material allegations re-
gardless of where the burden of proof lies. Ordinarily, this dis-
tinction would be immaterial, because the plaintiff usually must
prove all the material allegations of his declaration in order to
make a prima facie case at the trial. Such, for instance, is true
in the action of trespass. But in some of the forms of action,
there are a few instances, somewhat anomalous, where the plain-
tiff must allege matters which he is not required to prove, as, for
example, falsity of the words in libel or slander and non-payment
in debt or assumpsit. If it were not for these exceptional in-
stances, the fourth alternative would be preferable to the third,
because it is simpler in application. It would introduce no inno-
vation as to non-payment. The present general issues put pay-
ment in issue. But it would put in issue the falsity (or truth)
of the words in libel or slander without a justification having been
specially pleaded. If it would be undesirable to permit the de-
fendant to prove the truth of the words without a special plea, or
if it would be desirable to require a special plea of payment, these
would be considerations why the third alternative would be pre-
ferable to the fourth.
Objection to the third alternative because it would involve
determination of the burden of proof perhaps should not carry
much weight. In fact, it may be desirable to perform this task,
to the extent that there is any, at this stage of the procedure. It
is a task which, at any event, must be performed before the intro-
duction of proof. If the diagnosis is made when the issues are
made up, it will be done with more deliberation and lead to a
more definite understanding of the situation on the introduction
of proof.
(1) that the matter in the majority of cases will not be controverted in the
evidence; or (2) that the matter is difficult for the pleader to prove because
of the nature of the evidence or because the truth or falsity of the matter
is more peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite party.
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As to the replication and the subsequent pleadings, little need
be said. After the plea, the pleading process under the local prac-
tice is comparatively simple.
A joinder of issue, or similiter, upon a traverse (upon the
general issue, for instance), which could not occur until the replica-
tion stage, is unnecessary at any stage of the pleadings.
"When any party takes issue on another party's plead-
ing, or traverses the same, or demurs, so that such other party
is not let in to allege any new matter, no similiter or joinder
in demurrer shall be necessary, but either party may proceed
as if there were a similiter or joinder in demurrer.'' '
Most that has been said with reference to the formal part?
and contents of pleas will apply to replications and the subsequent
pleadings. The same statute which dispenses with the actionem
non and prayer of judgment in pleas likewise dispenses with the
formal commencement, or precludi non, and prayer of judgment in
replications and the subsequent pleadings.f And, of course, the
statute dispensing generally with formal requirements in the
allegations' is applicable to all pleadings indiscriminately.
After pleas, there is nothing at the common law which re-
sembles the general issues except the replication de injuria, which
is permitted as a general traverse of all the material allegations
of pleas in certain forms of action and under certain circum-
stances. Where the replication de injuria is not proper, the
plaintiff is compelled to resort to a specific traverse for the pur-
pose of denying any allegation of a plea. The replication de
injuri, in its common law technical form, is not used under the
local practice; but, in lieu thereof, the plaintiff makes use of what
is called a "general replication,' '' the effect of which is to traverse
all the material allegations of the plea. The general replication
may be pleaded informally, in any language which discloses an
rW. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 44.
See 4 MINOR, INsTITUTEs (1878) 670, for the formal parts of a replica-
tion.
" W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 41. But see 4 MINOR, INSTITUTES
(1878) 671, to the effect that the precludi non and prayer of judgment are
still necessary when the replication does not maintain the whole action. The
observations in n. 11, supra, apply here.
t-W. VA. REv. CODE (1931), c. 56, art. 4, § 37.
0 See Selby v. Bardons, 3 Barnwall & Adolphus 2, SUNDERLAND, CASES ON
CommoN LAW PLEADING (1832) 660; KEIGWIN, CASES IN COmmON LAw
PLEADING (1924) 608-9; 4 MINOR, INSTITUTEs (1878) 671-2. Professor
Keigwin explains that the use of this traverse was much extended through
the effect of the Hilary Term Rules.
0 National Valley Bank of Staunton v. Houston, 66 W. Va. 336, 66 S. E.
465 (1909); Parf.itt v. Sterling Veneer & Basket Co., 68 W. Va. 438, 69 S.
E. 985 (1910); Hunt v. DiBacco, 69 W. Va. 449, 71 S. E. 584 (1910).
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intent to "reply generally" to the plea. It is appropriate in all
forms of action and with reference to any plea the allegations of
which are subject to a traverse. The writer is not aware of any
statute authorizing this practice, which is an innovation upon the
common law, and has not observed in the local cases or books any
explanation that would justify its use. It is significant, however,
that a similar practice was adopted by statute in England about
the middle of the last century, and it may be surmised that the
English statutory practice has been adopted by the courts of this
state without legislative sanction.
"The Hilary Rules, as a whole, have not been adopted
in any of the American states, and the English decisions upon
this point have not generally been accepted here as authorities
per se. But in 1852 an English statute provided that either
party might plead, in answer to the plea or subsequent plead-
ing of his adversary, that he joins issue thereon, in this form,
'The plaintiff joins issue on the defendant's (1st) plea,' or
'The defendant joins issue upon the plaintiff's replication to
the first plea.' The effect of such a joinder is to traverse and
put in issue all the material averments in the pleading on
which issue is joined. This form of pleading has been well
said to be 'in the nature of a general replication de injuria.'
"In many, perhaps most, American jurisdictions a like
joinder in issue is authorized in all actions and at any stage
of the cause. As such form of pleading is equivalent to the
Replication de Injuria in its effect of compendious negation,
the practical result is that a party may in any action, not only
reply, but rejoin or surrejoin de injuria; and some lawyers
who shudder at the imaginary intricacies of pleading would
be shocked to learn that they have all their lives been using
the archaic and mysterious Replication de Injuria in disguise,
and to an extent vastly beyond the contemplation of the com-
mon law, very much as the bourgeois in Moliere's comedy was
startled to discover that he had always spoken prose without
knowing that it was prose. '
Whatever the origin of the local practice, it is believed to be
wholly desirable. This general replication is subject to none of
the criticisms which apply to the general issues which let in af-
firmative defenses. All new matter in opposition to any plea must
be pleaded by a special replication. Yet it has that precise scope
of denial which would seem to be desirable in the general issues.
We should be entirely thankful that we have it instead of the
replication de injuria. There may not be anything mysterious
about the use of the replication de injuria in a situation where it is
wKEIGWIN, op. cit. supra n. 59, 609-610.
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proper to use it, but the diagnosis of situations for the purpose
of determining the propriety of its use calls for some of the most
subtle distinctions in the whole course of procedure; and after all,
its use is limited.
In conclusion, space will permit only a brief consideration of
the statutes permitting and regulating multiple pleading. The
statutes permitting pleas in abatement and in bar at the same
time,' any number of pleas in bar and a demurrer at the same
time and more than one replication to the same plea,' have long
been familiar; but it may not be so generally known that, until
the enactment of the Revised Code, there could not be a demurrer
and a replication at the same time to the same plea." Nor, since
special pleadings are seldom used beyond the replication stage,
may it be so well understood that, after that stage, the common
law requiring singleness of issue both as to law and facts is still
in force in this state; and hence that there can be only one re-
joinder to the same replication and there cannot be a rejoinder
and a demurrer to the same replication at the same time.'
As already suggested, there is not very frequent occasion
for filing a special pleading after the replication stage, and the
occasion for filing more than one would be still less frequent; but
the writer has always been inclined to believe that the statute
might have given entire liberty in that respect at any stage of the
pleadings without any serious risk of further unduly multiplying
the issues, which is the only objection. It would seem obvious
that the chances for unduly multiplying the issues by multiple
pleading after the replication stage are rather negligible in com-
parison with the effect in that respect of the present statutes pro-
viding for multiple pleas and replications. There might be-more
occasion for pleading and demurring at the same time after the
replication stage, but to permit such a practice would only produce
an extra issue of law to be decided by the court and would in no
way tend to amplify or confuse the issues which the jury must
decide. It would seem desirable to expand the terms of the statute
so as to permit either party, at any stage of the pleadings, to file
as many different pleadings as he may desire and to demur at
the same time, for the sake of uniformity in practice, if for no
other reason.
2W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 38.
1Id., c. 56, art. 4, § 39.
-, Camden Clay Company v. Town of NTew Martinsville, 67 W. Va. 525, 68
S. E. 118 (1910). The procedure was to withdraw the demurrer after it had
been overruled and then reply.
61 Under the present law, after a demurrer to the replication is overruled,
it is necessary tn withdraw the demurrer before rejoining, and a similar
practice is necessary at all subsequent stages of the procedure.
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